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From Principles to Rules: The Case for
Statutory Rules Governing Aspects of
Judicial Disqualification
JULA HUGHES AND PHILIP BRYDEN*
The common law “reasonable apprehension of bias” test for judicial disqualification is highly
fact- and context-specific. While there are good reasons for this approach as a general
proposition, it also gives rise to considerable uncertainty for both judges and litigants in
considering whether or not it is appropriate for a judge to sit in a marginal case. This article
explores statutory judicial disqualification regimes in the United States, Germany, and Quebec
to gain insights into how statutory rules can be employed to provide greater clarity to judges
and litigants who are addressing situations that have the potential to give rise to judicial
disqualification. Using these insights, the authors then propose the use of statutory rules
to address problem areas with respect to professional relationships with former colleagues
and clients, prior judicial involvement with litigants, extrajudicial writings, and procedures
for making determinations concerning judicial disqualification.
L’épreuve de « crainte raisonnable de partialité » prévue par la common law pour nécessiter
à un magistrat de se récuser repose fortement sur les faits et le contexte. Bien que cette
approche soit généralement bien fondée, elle suscite tant chez les juges que chez les
plaideurs une grande incertitude quand vient le temps de déterminer si un juge est habilité à
siéger dans un cas douteux. Cet article examine le régime d’incapacité judiciaire prévu par la
loi aux États-Unis, en Allemagne et au Québec afin de mieux comprendre comment les règles
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prévues par la loi peuvent clarifier tant au bénéfice des juges que des plaideurs les situations
susceptibles d’entraîner une incapacité judiciaire. À partir de cela, les auteurs proposent le
recours aux règles prévues par la loi pour résoudre les problèmes que pourraient entraîner
des relations professionnelles avec d’anciens collègues ou clients, une implication juridique
préalable avec les plaideurs, des écrits extrajudiciaires et les procédures susceptibles
d’entraîner une incapacité judiciaire.
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COURTS IN SEVERAL COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS have adopted one variation

or another of a highly fact-driven and contextual “reasonable apprehension of
bias” test for judicial disqualification. For example, the English Court of Appeal
in the Locabail decision emphasized that “every application must be decided on
the facts and circumstances of the individual case.”1 Similarly, the Privy Council
has asserted in a New Zealand case that “[t]his is a corner of the law in which
the context, and the particular circumstances, are of supreme importance.”2 The
Supreme Court of Canada, drawing on these decisions, concluded in Wewaykum
that “[a]s a result, it cannot be addressed through peremptory rules, and contrary
to what was submitted during oral argument, there are no ‘textbook’ instances.”3
Despite this assertion by Canada’s highest court, we argue in this article that
statutory rules have a useful role to play in the law of judicial disqualification.
1.
2.
3.

Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd, [1999] EWCA Civ 3004, [2000] QB
451 at para 480.
Man O’War Station Ltd v Auckland City Council (Judgment No 1), [2002] UKPC 28 at para
11, [2002] 3 NZLR 577 (PC).
Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 SCC 45 at para 77, [2003] 2 SCR
259 [Wewaykum].
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To advance this argument, we draw on the results of a study of the experiences
and attitudes of Canadian provincial and territorial judges concerning recusal
and disqualification4 to identify some of the difficulties judges experience in
applying the fact-sensitive “reasonable apprehension of bias” test in marginal
cases and some of the reasons for these difficulties. We then consider experiences
in two countries, the United States and Germany, that have to a significant extent
codified judicial disqualification. Further, we discuss the experience with statutory
provisions governing judicial disqualification in the province of Quebec in
particular. While these codifications typically include a general requirement that
judges not sit on cases where their impartiality might reasonably be questioned,5
they often supplement these general provisions with more detailed rules governing
disqualification based on certain facts that might give rise to a concern about
impartiality. Of equal importance, they often contain rules identifying situations
that do not, without more, result in a judge’s disqualification.
In each of the comparator jurisdictions, we situate recusal rules within a broader
constitutional and cultural context related to the role of the judiciary, though
we limit the scope of the analysis to areas that might be helpful in considering
specific recommendations for adaptation to the Canadian context outside of
Quebec. We give an overview of the enumerated grounds of disqualification
and consider the relationship between general grounds of disqualification and
enumerated grounds. In short, in Germany and the United States, the enumerated
grounds are grounds for automatic disqualification. In Quebec, only one of the
enumerated grounds is a basis for automatic disqualification, though the other
codified grounds will usually be sufficient to require disqualification despite the
permissive statutory language. Lastly, we describe the procedural regime in each
jurisdiction, with particular focus on the question of who decides recusal motions.
We suggest that there are at least three substantive areas where a rule-based
approach to high-frequency bias issues is helpful: professional relationships
between justice personnel and litigation participants; prior judicial consideration
in a case or in related litigation; and extrajudicial writings suggesting a

4.
5.

Philip Bryden & Jula Hughes, “The Tip of the Iceberg: A Survey of the Philosophy and
Practice of Canadian Provincial and Territorial Judges Concerning Judicial Disqualification”
(2011) 48 Alta L Rev 569 [Bryden & Hughes, “Tip of the Iceberg”].
See e.g. 28 USC § 455(a). It reads, “Any justice, judge or magistrate judge of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.” See also Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 18b(b)(1). The rules state, “A judge
must recuse in any proceeding in which: (1) the judge’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.”
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predisposition. Additionally, and importantly, we suggest that procedural rules
regarding recusal motions should be made explicit.6

I. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON DIFFICULTIES IN APPLYING
THE “REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF BIAS” TEST
The empirical data for this article are drawn from our earlier study (conducted
with the assistance of the Canadian Association of Provincial Court Judges) of
Canadian provincial and territorial court judges’ attitudes toward and experiences
with recusal and disqualification. We surveyed 137 provincial and territorial
judges. Our survey respondents included provincial court judges from each of
the ten Canadian provinces and three territorial judges. The survey was in two
parts. The first part of the survey asked questions about the type of jurisdiction
the judges exercised, their personal experience with recusal, and their general
expectations with respect to recusal in their jurisdiction. The second, and longer,
part consisted of thirty-two scenarios where recusal might be appropriate and
asked for the judges’ views on these scenarios, which dealt with professional
relationships, personal relationships, and prior knowledge derived from other
judicial proceedings. We describe the methodology and results in detail elsewhere.7
Three findings from that earlier study are significant for present purposes. The
first is that reported decisions significantly under-represent the incidence of
recusal because most of the time judges recuse themselves of their own motion
without formal process and without issuing reasons. Two-thirds of our survey
respondents indicated that they recused themselves between one and five times
in a typical year. Another 19 per cent reported that they recused themselves more
than five times in a typical year, and only 14 per cent indicated that they would
not recuse themselves at all in a typical year. More than half of the respondents
(55 per cent) indicated that they recused themselves of their own motion more
than 90 per cent of the time, and another 30 per cent reported that they did so
between 50 per cent and 90 per cent of the time. Only 12 per cent indicated that
they never recused themselves of their own motion.8 These findings are consistent
with John Leubsdorf ’s observation that American jurisprudence on recusal and
disqualification is weighted heavily in favour of decisions explaining why it was
appropriate for the judge to sit because American judges are obliged to give
6.
7.
8.

See Philip Bryden, “Legal Principles Governing the Disqualification of Judges” (2003) 82
Can Bar Rev 555 at 596.
Bryden & Hughes, “Tip of the Iceberg,” supra note 4.
Ibid, 576-77.
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written reasons for rejecting an application to disqualify themselves, whereas,
those who do recuse themselves are not required to, and typically do not, give
written reasons for doing so.9
The second finding that is significant for present purposes is that most of
the survey respondents had a very weak sense of common practice concerning
issues that are, in theory, governed by local tradition. In Canada, the “reasonable
apprehension of bias” test is thought to potentially disqualify judges from hearing
cases involving their former clients or involving lawyers with whom they previously
practiced law. This is true even though the judge has no personal knowledge
of the case from his or her time in practice and no close personal relationship
with the lawyer from his or her former firm who is arguing the matter before
the judge. The breadth of this prohibition is mitigated by what is described as
a “cooling off period” after which the judge may hear cases involving former
clients or involving lawyers with whom the judge practised. This cooling-off
period applies absent other disqualifying circumstances, such as a close personal
relationship with the lawyer or client or personal involvement with the matter
prior to the judge’s appointment to the bench. The Canadian Judicial Council’s
publication Ethical Principles for Judges offers the following advice:
With respect to the judge’s former law partners, or associates and former clients,
the traditional approach is to use a “cooling off period,” often established by local
tradition at 2, 3 or 5 years and in any event at least as long as there is any indebtedness
between the firm and the judge ....10

Our survey asked if the courts in their jurisdiction had an accepted “cooling
off period” after which it was appropriate for a judge to hear cases where the
judge’s former client is a party or the judge’s former firm is representing a party.
We asked separate questions regarding former law firm colleagues and former
clients, and the majority of respondents answered that there was no accepted
cooling-off period in either case.11 A minority of the judges in most jurisdictions
answered “yes” to both questions,12 though the response that there was an accepted
cooling-off period was stronger for former law firms than for former clients.13
Moreover, in some jurisdictions (Alberta, Newfoundland, and New Brunswick)
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

John Leubsdorf, “Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification” (1987) 62 NYU L
Rev 237 at 244-45.
Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial
Council, 1998) at 52.
Bryden & Hughes, “Tip of the Iceberg,” supra note 4 at 602-603 (charts 8 and 9).
Ibid.
Ibid.
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the majority view was that there was an accepted cooling-off period for law firms,
though not for clients.14
The final relevant finding from our survey is that the “reasonable
apprehension of bias” test appears to give very limited guidance to judges in
addressing relatively common but analytically marginal fact patterns. The facts
are analytically marginal because judges encounter situations that may plausibly
be argued to give rise to bias concerns, but the legal test for whether a reasonable
apprehension of bias exists only marginally constrains the outcome of the analysis
for whether the judge should recuse. This was evident from the high degree of
variation in the responses to the thirty-two scenarios posed in the survey. Only
for one scenario was there near-universal agreement (more than 90 per cent) on
one of the four possible answers we offered to the question of whether or not
the respondent would be recused. In another five scenarios there was clearly a
dominant view, with 65 to 89 per cent of the respondents agreeing on a single
answer. In another nine scenarios, between 50 per cent and 64 per cent of the
respondents selected the most popular answer. On the other hand, in seventeen
of the thirty-two scenarios, no single answer attracted the support of 50 per cent
of the respondents. In eleven scenarios, the most popular answer attracted the
support of between 40 per cent and 49 per cent of the respondents, and in the
case of six scenarios, no single answer received the support of as many as 40 per
cent of the respondents.15
Based on the survey, we proposed that the “reasonable apprehension of bias”
test itself could be modified to give judges a better understanding of the rationale for
trends in the jurisprudence that are otherwise difficult to comprehend and better
tools with which to make decisions about whether or not to recuse themselves in
marginal cases.16 Our objective here is similar: to make the law governing judicial
disqualification more transparent and easier to apply consistently.
We take a relatively modest approach to statutory reform because we are
of the view that the “reasonable apprehension of bias” test is basically sound
and because we are not convinced that making judicial disqualification either
substantially more difficult or (more likely, if the American discourse is any
indicator) substantially easier would fundamentally alter the public perception

14. Ibid at 601-603.
15. Ibid at 579-80.
16. Jula Hughes & Philip Bryden, “Refining the Reasonable Apprehension of Bias Test:
Providing Judges Better Tools for Addressing Judicial Disqualification” (2013) 36 Dal L J
171 [Hughes & Bryden, “Refining the Test”].
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of the judicial system, at least in Canada.17 This is not to suggest that we believe
that all segments of the Canadian public are equally satisfied with the Canadian
judicial system or even that everyone who goes through a legal process in Canada
is completely convinced of the judge’s impartiality. Rather, our approach flows
from the view that making laws that are designed to satisfy the public that judges
are impartial represents only one element in a larger enterprise of satisfying
the public that the judicial system is accessible, efficient, and responsive, and
produces just results.18 The optimal point of balance between achieving this
public satisfaction and providing litigants with reassurance about judicial
impartiality is likely to be elusive, and in our view there are times when it is more
productive to focus on the clarity and consistency of the rules governing judicial
disqualification than on the precise content of the rules themselves.

17. In a fascinating study, James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira used a national survey of 1,092
Americans to explore the effects of campaign financing on their perceptions of judicial
impartiality. They presented the survey respondents with a vignette drawn from the fact
pattern in a recent US Supreme Court decision. See Caperton v AT Massey Coal Co, 556
US 868 (2009), 129 S Ct 2252 [Caperton]. They varied the basic fact pattern in a variety
of ways to determine whether, and if so to what extent, the respondents’ perceptions of the
judge’s impartiality and their overall perception of the impartiality of the justice system were
altered in response to these variations. Variations included such things as whether or not
the judge accepted a campaign contribution, whether and to what extent the contribution
influenced the judge’s electoral success, whether or not the judge recused, and whether or not
the judge’s vote influenced the outcome of the case in favour of the campaign contributor.
James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, “Judicial Impartiality, Campaign Contributions,
and Recusals: Results from a National Survey” (2013) 10 J Empirical Legal Studies 76. One of
their key findings was that:
…recusals can do something to rescue the fairness of courts, but that recusal alone is insufficient
to repair the damage created by a contributions-based perceived conflict of interest. Perhaps
no one really expects that recusal is a perfect palliative for conflicts but now we have national
evidence of the limits of that practice. We observe, however, that this experiment also discovers
that recusal might succeed in boosting perceptions of fairness and impartiality to at least a
marginally acceptable level (ibid at 96).

18. On the importance of these issues, see Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and
Family Matters, Access to Civil and Family Justice, A Roadmap for Change (Ottawa: Action
Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, 2013), online: <http://www.
cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2013/AC_Report_English_Final.pdf>.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN LAW GOVERNING
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
In both Canada and the United States, judicial impartiality is a constitutionally
protected right.19 The content of this right is informed by the common law in both
jurisdictions, though American thinking is influenced by English common law as
it existed prior to the American revolution, whereas Canadian law is influenced
by English common law as it had evolved by the middle of the nineteenth
century. In the United States, considerable discretion is left to Congress and state
legislatures to determine the precise parameters of the law governing judicial
disqualification.20 Contemporary law governing judicial disqualification at both
the federal and state level is significantly shaped by legislative action. The law in
both countries begins with a presumption of judicial impartiality, but there are
significant differences in terms of what is needed to displace the presumption of
judicial impartiality in the absence of statutory intervention.
The Canadian constitution’s commitment to judicial impartiality has been
interpreted in a manner that is informed by the modern common law “reasonable
apprehension of bias” test.21 Our courts have taken the view that, since it will
usually be impossible to determine whether or not a judge is actually biased,
the question is whether there are objective circumstances that would cause a
19. In Canada, this is made explicit for criminal trials in s 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 11(d). It reads,
“Any person charged with an offence has the right … (d) to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal.” The constitutional standard for judicial impartiality is the same as the common
law “reasonable apprehension of bias” standard and is linked to broader concepts of judicial
independence and fundamental justice. See R v RDS, [1997] 3 SCR 484 at para 31, 161
NSR (2d) 241 [RDS] (respecting the “reasonable apprehension of bias” standard); Reference
re: Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of PEI, [1997] 3 SCR 3 at paras 111-13,
156 Nfld & PEIR 1 [Provincial Judges Reference] (respecting judicial independence); Ruffo
v Conseil de la Magistrature, [1995] 4 SCR 267 at para 38 (available on CanLii) (respecting
fundamental justice); Pearlman v Manitoba Law Society Judicial Committee, [1991] 2
SCR 869, 84 DLR (4th) 105 (respecting fundamental justice). In the United States, the
constitutional concern for judicial impartiality flows from judicial interpretation of the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See e.g. Caperton, supra note 17;
Withrow v Larkin 421 US 35 (1975), 95 S Ct 1456.
20. See FTC v Cement Institute, 333 US 683 at 702 (1948), 68 S Ct 793; Tumey v Ohio, 273 US
510 at 523 (1927), 47 S Ct 437.
21. See RDS, supra note 19 at paras 31, 46, 48-49; Provincial Judges Reference, supra note 19
at paras 111-13.
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reasonable person to believe that the judge was not impartial.22 The existence
of objective circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe that,
on balance, the judge would either consciously or unconsciously fail to decide
the case fairly, is sufficient in Canada to displace the presumption of impartiality.
Because common law and constitutional concepts of impartiality are essentially
the same, judicial disqualification decisions in Canada are almost invariably made
using common law standards.23
As noted above, American constitutional law governing judicial
disqualification is influenced by pre-Revolutionary English common law,
which took a restrictive approach to judicial disqualification and required
disqualification only where the judge had a financial interest in the outcome
of the dispute.24 Even though English common law was using a variation of the
familiar “apprehension of bias” framework by the mid-nineteenth century,25
American courts did not modify the common law to adopt an “apprehension of
bias” approach to judicial disqualification. The due process protections in the US
Constitution have therefore been interpreted as preventing a probability of actual
bias on the part of the judge, as opposed to guaranteeing that there will be no
appearance that a judge might be biased.26
The evolution of American law of judicial disqualification has accordingly
taken place primarily through federal and state statutes, though state constitutions
and rules of court also contain rules expanding disqualification in circumstances
beyond those required by the US Constitution. Federal and state statutes have
22. Wewaykum, supra note 3 at paras 66-67; RDS, supra note 19 at paras 31-49 (L’Heureux-Dubé
and McLachlin JJ), 111-15 (Cory J).
23. As discussed in greater detail below, both arts 201-205 of the new Code of Civil Procedure
(RLRQ c C-25.01) enacted by the Quebec National Assembly in 2014 and arts 234-42
of its predecessor, the Code of Civil Procedure (RSQ c C-25), set out rules governing the
disqualification of Quebec judges in civil proceedings. Code of Civil Procedure, arts 201-205
CCP [New Code of Civil Procedure]; Code of Civil Procedure arts 234-42 CCP. Although
this has not always been the case, in recent years the judicial disqualification provisions of
the pre-2014 versions of the Code were interpreted in a manner that was designed to make
them broadly consistent with the common law approach to judicial disqualification. See e.g.
Dufour v 99516 Canada Inc, [2001] RJQ 1202 (available on QL) (QC CA) [Dufour].
24. See Caperton, supra note 17. See more generally, Richard Flamm, Judicial Disqualification,
Recusal and Disqualification of Judges, 2d ed (Berkeley: Banks & Jordan Law Publishing Co,
1997), ch 1 [Flamm, Judicial Disqualification]; Richard Flamm, “The History of Judicial
Disqualification in America” (2013) 52 Judges’ Journal 12.
25. See Dimes v Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal (1852), 3 HLC 759, 10 ER 301 (HL).
26. See Caperton, supra note 17; Raymond McKoski, “Disqualifying Judges When Their
Impartiality Might Reasonably Be Questioned: Moving Beyond a Failed Standard” (2014) 56
Arizona L Rev 411 at 431-33 [“Disqualifying Judges”].
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expanded disqualification using two different techniques, though these approaches
are not mutually exclusive and some jurisdictions employ both. The first technique
is to adopt a general requirement that judges must disqualify themselves in any
proceeding “in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,”27
supplemented by a series of more specific rules identifying instances in which a
judge is disqualified. This approach is inspired by the 1972 ABA Model Code
of Judicial Conduct (ABA Model Code), initially adopted by the ABA’s House
of Delegates in 1972 and subsequently modified in 1990, 2007, and 2010. The
ABA Model Code is designed as a set of ethical principles governing the conduct
and discipline of judges, but the provisions of what was originally Canon 3E,
now Rule 2.11, dealing with disqualification, were often incorporated directly
or with some modification into statutes that gave parties rights to require judges
to disqualify themselves in the circumstances enumerated by the statute.28 The
second technique is to adopt what are described as “peremptory disqualification”
rules, provisions that essentially allow a party to a proceeding to disqualify a
judge simply by alleging that the judge has a bias against the party or in favour
of a party adverse in interest. Peremptory disqualification provisions have often
been interpreted restrictively by American courts,29 but a significant theme in
contemporary American legal discourse is a debate over whether peremptory

27. See e.g. 28 USC § 455(a) (1948).
28. See e.g. ibid, § 455.
29. For example, Richard Flamm argues persuasively that 28 USC § 144 was originally intended
by Congress to create a peremptory disqualification regime for federal district court judges.
Richard Flamm, Judicial Disqualification, supra note 24. § 144 reads, in relevant part:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient
affidavit that a judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either
against him or in favour of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but
another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.

When this provision was originally considered by the United States Supreme Court in Berger
v US, the Court concluded that the allegation in the affidavit had to be “legally sufficient”
to warrant the disqualification of the judge, thereby transforming the provision into one
that only required disqualification where there was just cause. Berger v US (1921), 255 US
22, 55 S Ct 629. See also Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex Perschbacher, “The Elusive Goal of
Impartiality” (2011) 97 Iowa L Rev 181 at 211 [“Elusive Goal”].
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disqualification should be expanded.30 American disqualification law at the state
level also differs significantly from the law in common law jurisdictions such as
Canada and England because it has to accommodate the fact that judges in many
states are elected. As the cost of running successful judicial election campaigns has
escalated, there has been considerable debate about whether current approaches
to judicial disqualification in cases involving contributors to judicial election
campaigns are adequate.31
For present purposes, it is more relevant to explore the detailed rules found
in provisions that expand upon a general requirement of disqualification where
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, than it is to discuss peremptory
disqualification or judicial elections. Interesting as the peremptory disqualification
and judicial election debates are, they have little resonance in the context of
Canada and other comparable jurisdictions. Moreover, because the specific rules
governing disqualification can be understood to represent specific examples of
a more general requirement of disqualification wherever a judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, one can relatively easily imagine them inspiring
rules that could supplement a more general “reasonable apprehension of bias” test
for disqualification in Canada and other common law jurisdictions.
The main federal disqualification statute, 28 USC § 455 (and in particular,
§ 455 (b)–(f )), is a good example of this type of provision. 28 USC § 455 begins
with a general prohibition in subsection 455(a) that states: “Any justice, judge,
or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Subsection 455(b)
begins with the statement that “[the judge] shall also disqualify himself in the
following circumstances ... .” As a result, subsection (b) puts in place a regime
of automatic disqualification that does not require an inquiry into whether or
not the circumstances would cause a reasonable person to question the judge’s

30. See e.g. McKoski, “Disqualifying Judges,” supra note 26; Charles Geyh, “Draft Report of the
ABA Judicial Disqualification Project” (2008), online: <http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/judicial_independence/jdp_geyh_report.authcheckdam.pdf> at
60-65; James Sample & Michael Young, “Invigorating Judicial Disqualification: Ten Potential
Reforms” (2008) 92 Judicature 26 at 27-28; Debra Lyn Bassett, “Judicial Disqualification in
the Federal Appellate Courts” (2002) 87 Iowa L Rev 1213 at 1224, 1251-1256.
31. See e.g. Bassett & Perschbacher, “Elusive Goal,” supra note 29; Christina Newton,
“Interpreting Caperton: a Hybrid Solution to the Public Choice Problems of Judicial
Elections” (2011) 8 J L Econ and Pol’y 143.
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impartiality.32 Subsection (b) has five clauses. The first requires disqualification
where the judge has “a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party” or has
“personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.”33
The second mandates disqualification where the judge, while in private practice,
“served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy,” where “a lawyer with whom
[the judge] previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer
concerning the matter,” and where the judge or a lawyer with whom the
judge previously practised law “has been a material witness” concerning the
proceeding.34 The third provides that the judge is disqualified where he or she
“served in government employment and in such capacity participated as counsel,
advisor or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion
concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy.”35
It is worth pausing at this point to note that, although these provisions reflect
themes that would be familiar to judges applying the “reasonable apprehension
of bias” test for disqualification in Canada, they are both narrower and in some
respects broader than the grounds for disqualification found in the Canadian
jurisprudence. The second clause is narrower than Canadian disqualification
practice in the sense that it only requires disqualification where the judge
previously acted as a lawyer at an earlier stage in the same proceeding or where a
member of the judge’s former law firm acted in the proceeding while the judge was
still associated with the firm.36 Canadian common law would generally regard the
judge’s association with the firm or with the client as a basis for disqualification
32. The common law in England and New Zealand draws a distinction between circumstances in
which the judge’s disqualification is automatic and those where disqualification is the result
of a reasonable apprehension of bias. See R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex
p Pinochet Ugarte (No 2), [2000] 1 AC 119, [1999] 1 All ER 577 HL (Eng); Porter v Magill,
[2002] [2001] UKHL 67, 2 AC 357; Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, [2007] NZCA
334, [2007] 3 NZLR 495; Saxmere Company Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Ltd (No
1), [2009] NZSC 72, [2010] 1 NZLR 35, recalled [2009] NZSC 122, [2010] 1 NZLR 76.
In Canada and Australia, the common law employs a unified reasonable apprehension of
bias test to deal with all judicial disqualification cases. See Bryden & Hughes, “Tip of the
Iceberg,” supra note 4; Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000), [2000] HCA 63,
176 ALR 644 [Ebner]. As a practical matter, Canadian and Australian courts would typically
reach the same result as English and New Zealand courts in situations where automatic
disqualification would be required, but they would do so using a “reasonable apprehension of
bias” test. See Philip Bryden & Jula Hughes, “Legal Principles Governing the Disqualification
of Judges” (July 29, 2014) at 7-21, online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2473557>.
33. 28 USC, supra note 27, § 455(b)(1).
34. Ibid, § 455(b)(2).
35. Ibid, § 455(b)(3).
36. Ibid, § 455(b)(2).
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for at least a period of time, whether or not the judge was involved with the matter
in question. At the same time, the second and third clauses37 contain a slightly
broader prohibition on judicial involvement in a matter than would be required
by Canadian law in the sense that in Canada the passage of time is a relevant
consideration for the purpose of deciding whether a judge is disqualified.38
The fourth clause deals with the judge’s personal financial interests as well
as those of his or her spouse or minor children residing in the judge’s household,
as well as “any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome
of the proceeding.”39 The statute includes an elaborate definition of financial
interest that not only defines what will be regarded as a financial interest but
also excludes certain types of interests from the definition.40 “Ownership in a
mutual or common investment fund that holds securities,” for example, “is
not a ‘financial interest’ in such securities unless the judge participates in the
management of the fund.”41 As a result, this automatic disqualification clause
treats financial interests in a way that is substantially similar to, if not necessarily
identical to, the way they would be treated under Canadian law, but gives much
greater clarity and more specific guidance than one would find in Canadian law.42
The fifth automatic disqualification clause applies where a member of the
judge’s family is a party, is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding, “is known by
the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome
of the proceeding,” or is “to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material
witness in the proceeding.”43 Once again, Canadian practice concerning judicial
disqualification on the basis of family relationship would produce substantially
similar, if not necessarily identical, results to this provision.44

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Ibid, § 455(b)(2)-(3).
Canadian Judicial Council, supra note 10 at 52.
28 USC, supra note 27, § 455(b)(4).
Ibid, § 455(d)(4).
Ibid, § 455(d)(4)(i).
Ibid, § 455(b)(4). As the Supreme Court of Canada observed in the Wewaykum case,
Canadian common law does not use the concept of automatic disqualification, and all types
of disqualification, including ones based on the judge’s financial interest in the outcome,
are decided on the basis of a “reasonable apprehension of bias” test. Wewaykum, supra note
3 at paras 72-73. On the other hand, the application of that test will normally result in
Canadian judges being disqualified where they have a direct and material financial interest in
the outcome of the case before them. See Canadian Judicial Council, supra note 10 at 45-46
(paras 6.E.5-6.E.7).
43. Ibid, § 455(b)(5).
44. See Canadian Judicial Council, supra note 10 at 44-46 (paras 6.E.3-6.E.7).
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Finally, subsections (e) and (f ) explicitly address the issue of waiver by the
parties.45 Waiver is not permitted in relation to the grounds of disqualification
enumerated in subsection 455(b), but it is allowed where disqualification arises
under the more general provisions of subsection 455(a) “provided it is preceded
by full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.”46 Outside of
Quebec, Canadian law governing waiver does not appear to draw any distinctions
concerning the circumstances in which parties can waive disqualification, but
there is a right to be fully informed of the relevant facts before the waiver doctrine
will be applied.47
While the ABA Model Code represents the dominant model for state laws
governing judicial disqualification, there is considerable variation in matters of
detail even among states that follow it. To take just one example, clause 170.1(2)
(B) of the California Code of Civil Procedure adopts a disqualification rule that
is similar to Canadian practice with respect to a judge’s former colleagues in legal
practice and former clients.48 After partially adopting the ABA Model Code by
indicating in clause 2(A) that a judge is disqualified if he or she “served as a lawyer
in the proceeding,” the California statute states:
B.

A judge shall be deemed to have served as a lawyer in the proceeding if within
the past two years:
i.

A party to the proceeding or an officer, director, or trustee of a party was
a client the judge when the judge was in the private practice of law or
a client of a lawyer with whom the judge was associated in the private
practice of law.

ii.

A lawyer in the proceeding was associated in the private practice of law.

This provision creates a presumptive rule of disqualification from the
adjudication of cases involving former colleagues or personal or law firm clients
during a two-year cooling-off period, while leaving in place a longer period of

45. Ibid, § 455(e)-(f ).
46. Ibid, § 455(a)-(b).
47. See Lambert v Lacey-House, 2013 NBCA 48 at paras 7, 19-21, 206 NBR (2d) 346 [Lambert].
For the situation in Quebec, see the discussion below of art 242 of Quebec’s former Code of
Civil Procedure. Code of Civil Procedure, art 242 CCP.
48. 48 California Code of Civil Procedure, cl 170.1(a)(2)(B).
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disqualification if the judge was personally involved as a lawyer in some aspect of
the proceeding.49
American law governing the procedure for judicial disqualification varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.50 In many instances, judges will recuse themselves
of their own motion, especially if it is evident that they fall within one of the
enumerated grounds upon which disqualification is required. Some American
jurisdictions have specific rules governing the procedures to be used by a party
who seeks the disqualification of a judge who does not recuse himself or herself
voluntarily, and in other jurisdictions the ordinary rules governing motion practice
apply.51 Typically the judge whose disqualification is sought decides the motion,
and in some jurisdictions the challenged judge has an affirmative obligation to
do so.52 In other jurisdictions, the judge whose disqualification is sought has the
discretion to transfer the decision to another judge, but this discretion is not
commonly exercised.53 There are some jurisdictions where a judge who receives a
motion seeking his or her recusal has the option of deciding to recuse himself or
herself, but if that option is not taken, the decision on whether or not the judge
is disqualified must be referred to another judge.54

III. AN OVERVIEW OF GERMAN LAW GOVERNING JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION
As in Canada, the guarantee of impartial adjudication in Germany is thought to
have constitutional dimensions. However, the Basic Law does not expressly grant
a specific right to an impartial tribunal. The jurisprudence instead anchors the
right in two sections of the Basic Law: the general principle of the rule of law

49. Clause 170.1(a)(2)(C) creates a comparable presumption for any judge who “served as a
lawyer for or officer of a public agency that is a party” to a proceeding. In this instance,
the judge is presumed to have served as a lawyer in the proceeding “if he or she personally
advised or in any way represented the public agency concerning the factual or legal issues in
the proceeding.” Ibid, cl 170.1(a)(2)(C).
50. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification, supra note 24, ch 17.
51. Ibid, § 17.2.
52. Ibid, § 17.6 at 499.
53. Ibid, § 17.6 at 501-502.
54. Ibid, § 17.6 at 502. See e.g. Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 18a, ss (f )-(g).
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(Rechtsstaatsprinzip) in article 20,55 and the right to a lawful judge in article 101.56
The latter clause introduces the notion of a lawful judge (gesetzlicher Richter).57
At its core, this right protects against secret, ad hoc, or otherwise unchecked
appointments of tribunals for specific purposes. In Canadian terms, it seems to
be most closely related to the right of access to a court of inherent jurisdiction.
In the jurisprudence of Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court
(Constitutional Court), the right to a lawful judge has been amplified to give
content to the notion that lawfulness includes impartiality. The right to one’s
lawful judge has a negative and a positive dimension: the negative right not to be
subjected to a judge who is tainted by bias and the positive right to adjudication
of the case before the court by the assigned judge absent a well-founded bias
concern. The latter right strongly implies a duty to sit. Judicial independence is
separately guaranteed in article 97.58 In criminal cases, courts have also resorted
to the right to free choice of counsel in some recusal situations.59
German federal law codifies judicial disqualification in the various rules
of court found in the courts’ enabling statutes. The constitutional, criminal,
and civil courts have structurally similar rules, but categories of automatic
disqualification are tailored to the jurisdictional subject matter of the respective
courts. Also, as the time of enactment varies, so does the actual wording. Various
administrative courts of specialized jurisdiction incorporate the civil code model
by reference.60 Compared to its Canadian counterpart, German law favours a
duty to sit, both substantively (by requiring judges to sit in some situations where
a Canadian judge would likely recuse) and procedurally (by ensuring that judges
are not able to bow out easily or unnecessarily). At the same time, by providing

55. The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive, and the judiciary
by law and justice. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, online: <https://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/> [Basic Law].
56. Klaus Schreiber, “ZR - Ausschließung und Ablehnung des Richters im Zivilprozess” (2011)
33:10 JURA - Juristische Ausbildung 745; ibid. Art 101 (1)(2) provides: “No one may be
removed from the jurisdiction of his lawful judge.”
57. Christoph Sowada, Der gesetzliche Richter im Strafverfahren (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002).
58. Basic Law, supra note 55, art 97.
59. German Code of Criminal Procedure [StPO], s 137(1), online: <http://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/> (official English translation by Brian Duffett and
Monika Ebinger, updated translation by Kathleen Müller-Rostin) [StPO].
60. § 54 Abs 1 VwGO; Alexander Ignor, “Befangenheit im Prozess” (2012) 5 Zeitschrift für
Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 228 at 230. Note that administrative courts are not
equivalent to Canadian administrative tribunals as judges rather than tribunal members sit
on these courts.
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grounds for automatic disqualification, the statutes introduce bright-line rules
for some high-frequency situations.
The statutory rules regarding disqualification proceed in two parts. First,
they set out situations that automatically disqualify a judge from hearing a case.
Second, they provide for recusal motions by a litigant or a judge where a fear of bias
exists or where a judge attempts to sit in a situation of automatic disqualification.
In the case of the Constitutional Court, the statute additionally narrows the
categories of automatic disqualification by excluding certain subcategories from
the application of the more general principles.
Statutes also provide for procedural issues including who decides the issue,
waiver, replacement procedures, and appellate remedies. These are potentially
of significant interest to Canadian courts, which have typically developed their
recusal procedures ad hoc.
While there is some variation in language, criminal, civil, and constitutional
courts all contemplate automatic disqualification for substantially the same
reasons: (1) Involvement by the judge or a close family member in the litigation
as a litigant or witness or, in the case of criminal courts, as victim;61 (2) prior
professional involvement in the matter as counsel or police officer; and (3) prior
judicial involvement.
Despite these commonalities, there are important differences among the
courts, particularly as they relate to the first and third categories. As regards the
first category, personal involvement, the Constitutional Court Act excludes family
status, occupation, ethnic origin, political party membership, and analogous
grounds as constituting personal involvement.62
As regards the third category, in criminal courts, the part of the criminal
procedure rules dealing with recusal would not appear to bar the participation of
a trial judge in a new trial but merely in the (appellate) decision to order a new
trial. However, section 354(2) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO)
precludes remittal to the trial judge following a successful appeal. It requires a
different chamber of the lower court to hear the new trial.63 Thus, unlike in
Canada, it is not open to the appellate court to remit a matter to the trial judge

61. In all cases, a close family member is defined as related by blood to the third degree or by
marriage to the second degree.
62. 62 Federal Constitutional Court Act [BVerfGG]), § 18 (translation by the Court available
online: <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Gesetze/
BVerfGG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1>).
63. StPO, supra note 59.
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for determination in light of the appellate decision.64 This represents a different
weighing of two competing objectives: Avoiding the possible perception of a
closed mind is preferred in the German context, while in the Canadian context,
efficiency and judicial resource management tip the balance in favour of a
power to remit.
In civil courts, there are three grounds related to prior judicial involvement
that give rise to automatic disqualification: (1) prior involvement in the final
adjudication of a matter; (2) prior involvement in a matter in which undue delay
is alleged; and (3) prior judicial involvement in mediation or other alternative
dispute resolution measures related to a particular matter.
In an interesting variation on the theme, the Constitutional Court Act also
disqualifies judges who have had prior judicial involvement by reason of their
office or profession but goes on to limit the scope of this ground of disqualification
in two important ways. First, it excludes prior involvement in the legislative
process as constituting disqualifying prior involvement, and second, it excludes
as a disqualifying ground the articulation of an academic opinion in relation to a
legal question of relevance to the proceeding.
In addition to automatic disqualification, a party may move for the recusal
of a judge in all courts for two reasons: one, because of a fear of bias, and two,
because a judge chose to sit despite the presence of automatic disqualification
grounds. The test for a fear of bias is whether, based on a reasoned apprehension
of the facts as they are known to it, the objecting party has cause to believe
that the judge will adopt an inner stance towards the party that may interfere
negatively with his or her impartiality or open mind.65 Courts have emphasized
that the question of judicial disqualification should be analyzed based on the
knowledge of the litigant rather than that of a legal insider.66
Generally, the jurisprudence is concerned with situations giving rise to a
fear of bias and, in particular, with the relationship between the enumerated
grounds of automatic disqualification and arguable analogous grounds that
might give rise to a fear of bias. The statutory rules are not exhaustive. One area
that gives rise to bias motions in civil courts is that of personal relationships
not covered by the automatic disqualification rules. Herbert Taubner suggests
a categorization of the case law relating to personal bias into five classes: family
64. Gunther Arzt, Der befangene Strafrichter: Zugleich eine Kritik an der Beschränkung der
Befangenheit auf die Parteilichkeit (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1969) at 1.
65. Gunter Widmaier & Stephan Barton, Münchener Anwaltshandbuch Strafverteidigung,
(Beck-Online: CH Beck, 2006) at para 73.
66. BGH (1988) StV 88, 417; BGH (1968) NJW 68, 710; ibid at para 73.
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relationships, memberships in clubs or corporations, acceptance of favours,
personal relationships with professional litigation participants other than lawyers,
and personal relationships with lawyers.67
Civil courts have found that a broader range of family and personal
relationships may give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias than merely
those covered by the automatic disqualification rules. Family relations and
other personal relationships warranting recusal include engagements, close
friendships, personal antagonism, paternity or maternity of a child or having
a child in common, and love affairs. On the other hand, the jurisprudence is
clear in limiting this extension: Absent additional considerations, siblings-in-law
(and similar family and social relationships that are not close or not current) and
professional encounters (e.g., a builder or tradesperson doing work at the judge’s
house) do not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The literature is split
on whether the relationship has to be direct or includes relationships with the
judge’s spouse.68
Memberships in organizations warrant recusal only if a club is very small, the
judge has a leadership role, and the club is directly involved in litigation. Since
judges, like all other citizens, have a constitutional right to be a member of a
political party, such membership is never a reason to recuse.
The legislature has taken a slightly different and narrower approach to
disqualifying personal relationships in criminal courts. While a criminal court
judge is automatically disqualified where the alleged victim is his or her spouse,
the prosecutor-spouse is not included in the list of automatic disqualification
relationships. Some commentators have argued that a judge should not preside
over a trial where her spouse is the prosecutor. This argument is at variance with
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court suggesting that in the absence of
disqualification language, a personal relationship with the prosecutor is not in
itself a basis for recusal.69 Further, the legislative choice permitting judges to sit
when they have a close personal relationship with the prosecutor is clear.

67. Herbert Taubner, Der befangene Zivilrichter (Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre, 2005).
68. Ibid, citing Christian Stemmler, Befangenheit im Richteramt: eine systematische Darstellung
der Ausschliessungs- und Ablehnungsgründe unter Berücksichtigung des gesetzlichen Richters als
materielles Prinzip (PhD Dissertation, University of Tübingen, 1975) (favouring the narrower
view); Taubner, ibid, citing Herbert Pabst v. Ohain, Die Ablehnung eines Richters wegen
Besorgnis der Befangenheit aus politischen Gründen (PhD Dissertation, University of Freiburg,
1932) (for the broader view).
69. Klaus Ellbogen & Felix Schneider, “Besorgnis der Befangenheit bei Ehe zwischen Richterin
und Staatsanwalt” (2012) 5 Juristische Rundschau 188.

872

(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

As in other institutional design choices, there are competing values at stake
here. The appearance of impartiality from the perspective of the accused will
likely be affected when the judge is married to the prosecutor. On the other hand,
judge-prosecutor marriages are very commonplace, and recusal on that basis
would affect a large number of docketing decisions, particularly in small towns.70
The Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) has recently ruled in a
civil context that recusal is warranted where the judge is married to someone in
the same law firm as counsel in the case before the court, even where there is no
evidence that the lawyer-spouse and the judge had discussed the file or that the
lawyer-spouse’s financial interests were significantly affected.71 In this case, the
judge was married to a lawyer who practiced in the same law firm as respondent
counsel. Since that decision was grounded in constitutional considerations,
it may well be that the criminal court jurisprudence will follow suit.
This situation will be familiar to Canadian judges, as are prior professional
relationships between judges and lawyers. Indeed, one of the areas of judicial
disqualification with significant difficulties in Canada concerns the question
whether and when professional relationships give rise to a reasonable
apprehension of bias. The issue arises with frequency because Canadian judges
are typically appointed from the practising bar and tend to have a well-established
set of relationships with fellow lawyers at the time of their appointment. This
problem arises less frequently in Germany because most judges are appointed
as full-time judges immediately following their law studies and a brief period
of clerkship (frequently served in courts or prosecution offices).72 There are
two significant exceptions: The first is that a full professor of law is entitled to
70. American law typically reaches the opposite conclusion in the balancing of these concerns.
At the federal level, judges are prohibited from sitting in cases where a spouse is acting
as counsel. See 28 USC, supra note 27, § 455(b)(5). In Florida, the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides that
[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself … where the judge or the judge’s spouse, or a person
within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; … a lawyer in the
proceeding; is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding; [or] is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material
witness in the proceeding” [emphasis added].

Canon 3(E)(1)(d).
71. (2012) V ZB 102/11 (BGH 5th Zivilsenat) (Germany). See Katrin Dittert,
“Richterablehnung wegen Tätigkeit dessen Ehegatten in der von der Gegenseite beauftragten
Rechtsanwaltskanzlei” (2012) 15 jurisPR-MietR note 5.
72. Keith R. Fisher, “Education for Judicial Aspirants” (2011) 31 J Nat’l Ass’n Admin L Judiciary
99 at 115 (reprinted).
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hold part-time judicial office, and the second is that the appointment practice
of the Constitutional Court, as discussed below in more detail, routinely sees
limited-term appointments from the public law professoriate. It is thus not
surprising that some of the most contentious cases regarding recusal in response
to professional relationships arise in the Constitutional Court.
One of the most controversial recusal decisions of the Constitutional Court
involved a politician who was a member of a law firm with which one of the
judges of the Court was associated.73 The Federal Minister of the Interior had
allegedly accepted donations in contravention of the country’s party financing
laws. Justice Jentsch gave notice to his judicial colleagues of facts that might
require recusal.74 In a split decision, four judges of the Court ruled that there was
no reasonable apprehension of bias since mere membership in a political party
was not a cause for recusal and Justice Jentsch could not be said to have a direct
interest in the outcome of the litigation.75 This was the result because Justice
Jentsch’s membership in the firm had been suspended by operation of law during
his tenure on the court and despite the fact that the law firm’s name continued to
include both his own name and Minister Kanther’s.
When a related matter came to the Court in 2003, Justice Jentsch again gave
notice of a potential apprehension of bias. He repeated his explanation about the
membership of Mr. Kanther and his ongoing relationship with the law firm. This
time, a unanimous Constitutional Court found that Justice Jentsch’s relationship
with Mr. Kanther did give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and that he
should not sit. The Court distinguished its earlier decision on the basis that the
prior review had taken place in the context of an abstract judicial review whereas
73. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in this regard has a prominent and unusual
commentator. In 2000, former Chief Justice Benda, who had led the Court until 1983,
published a paper in which he criticized, with some venom, the recusal practice of his former
Court. In it, he argued that the Constitutional Court applied too strong a presumption of
impartiality, in part out of elitism or arrogance (asserting that a judge of the highest court
is presumed to be of such high calibre, intellectually and morally, to make bias a virtual
impossibility) and in part out of excessive collegial courtesy (noting that both in cases of
applications and in cases of self-disclosure, it is the judicial colleagues of the impugned
judge who adjudicate the motion). See Ernst Benda, “Befangenes zur Befangenheit”
(2000) NJW 3620.
74. He was a founding partner in a law firm that now, with his consent, included the minister.
He noted that his membership in the firm had been suspended for the duration of his tenure
on the Court by virtue of § 104 of the Constitutional Court Act. BverfGG, supra note 62, §
104. He also advised his colleagues that he no longer participated in the financial, revenue,
and governance decisions of the firm except in fundamental matters of membership.
75. (2000) BVerfGE 102, 192 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany).
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the current case involved a closer connection between the allegations and Mr.
Kanther. Thus, the personal reputation of Mr. Kanther and, by implication, the
personal connection between him and the judge, were now squarely in issue.
An adverse finding of the Court against Mr. Kanther might implicate him in
further proceedings and affect the interests of the law firm. The Court affirmed
the general presumption that a judge of the Constitutional Court possesses the
necessary independence and distance to enable him or her to act impartially and
objectively but noted that the legislative scheme was designed to address what
it called the “evil appearance” (böser Schein) of a possible lack of impartiality.76
Upon reasonable appreciation of all of the circumstances, it therefore concluded
that there was sufficient cause to doubt the impartiality of the judge because of
his partnership with Mr. Kanther in the law firm.77 The difficulty encountered by
the German court illustrates the usefulness of cooling-off periods adopted in the
Canadian context and also highlights the importance of clear guidance for judges
on post-retirement professional activities.
Another area where the Canadian and German experiences are structurally
different but mutually illuminating is in their approaches to prior judicial
involvement. A common source of applications for recusal in criminal cases is
communications between the judge or presiding judge and one party. German
law does not permit plea bargaining except under the direct supervision of the
courts. Preparatory communications by the judge with one side lead to bias
concerns in that the resulting ‘deal’ indicates a closed mind on the part of the
judge.78 The federal parliament has now acted to regulate such communications79
and the Constitutional Court has held that only communications specifically
authorized by the Act are permitted, precluding informal arrangements.80 While
the problem is tied to the peculiarities of German procedural law, the solution
might have application in Canada. High-frequency bias problems may be subject
to legislative bright-line solutions. This would support arguments we have made
elsewhere on, for example, breach hearings.81
The question of how much assistance a judge may provide to a self-represented
litigant before crossing the line into apparent partiality raised novel bias issues

76.
77.
78.
79.

BVerfGE 108, 122 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany).
Ibid at paras 24-26.
(2007) 5 StR 227/07 (BGH, 5th Strafsenat) (Germany).
Gesetz zur Regelung der Verständigung im Strafverfahren vom 29. Juli 2009 (BGBl S. 2353)
[Regulation of Communications in Criminal Proceedings Act, July 29, 2009].
80. (2013) BVerfGe, 2 BvR 2628/10 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany).
81. Hughes & Bryden, “Refining the Test,” supra note 16 at 191.
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in German civil courts, as has been the case in the United States82 and, more
recently, in Canada.83 The Code of Civil Procedure was amended in 2004 to require
judges to play a more active case management role. This also means that they now
provide more assistance to parties than previously thought appropriate in the
generally adversarial system of civil justice in Germany. Gunnar Sticken argues
that the novel obligations on judges to explain, inform, and prevent surprises
may all operate to threaten judicial neutrality.84 Four situations are thought to
give rise to concerns: (1) the judge directs a change in the pleadings; (2) the
judge advises a party of an impending limitation period; (3) the judge is possibly
obligated to explain the evaluation of evidence prior to rendering judgment; and
(4) the party is or is not represented (does either scenario make a difference to the
judicial obligation to advise?).
Sticken contends that neutrality requires that the judge not pursue “purposes”
of his or her own as the adversarial nature of the proceedings is a necessary
guarantor of impartiality. However, he accepts that promoting settlement does
not undermine the impartiality of the judicial officer.85 Further, he concludes
that the scope of the legislative change is modest and consistent with impartiality
requirements. In his view, the new provisions do not require a judge to direct
changes in pleadings or notify parties of a limitation period.86
On the other side of the coin, whether hostility between a judge and counsel
is a reason to recuse is a complex question. The jurisprudence consistently holds
that the hostility must spill over into hostility against the party, not merely the
lawyer, and that the expression of such hostility must occur in the proceeding in
which recusal is sought.
As in Canada, the expression of support, hostility, or any other views in a
judicial capacity is dealt with distinctly from the question of any expression of
views in an extra-judicial capacity. The statutory regime of the Constitutional
Court Act contemplates exceptions to situations of automatic disqualification,
several of which relate to the expression of views in an extrajudicial capacity.
82. Jona Goldschmidt, “How Are Courts Handling Pro Se Litigants” (1998-1999)
82 Judicature 13.
83. Richard Devlin, C Adèle Kent & Susan Lightstone, “The Past, Present ... and Future(?)
of Judicial Ethics Education in Canada” (2013) 16 Legal Ethics 1; Jona Goldschmidt,
“Judicial Assistance to Self-represented Litigants: Lessons from the Canadian Experience”
(2008–2009) 17 Mich St U Coll L J Int’l L 601.
84. Gunnar Sticken, Die ‘neue’ materielle Prozeßleitung (§ 139 ZPO) und die Unparteilichkeit des
Richters (Köln Berlin München: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2004).
85. Ibid at 187.
86. Ibid at 185-90.
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The question about the scope of these exceptions is framed as exploring the
relationship between cases of automatic disqualification and those warranting
recusal on a case-by-case basis. For example, given the express terms of Article
18,87 direct involvement in the legislative process does not disqualify a judge.
Could advice given by a judge to government in a professional capacity ever
give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias? The current jurisprudence of both
chambers of the Constitutional Court uses a “without more” test. Under this
approach, the mere fact that a judge has previously come into contact with or
has articulated views on a matter is never sufficient, without more, to justify
disqualification. The rules of when certain additional facts are sufficient to unseat
the very strong presumption in favour of a duty to sit are being developed on a
case-by-case basis.
Another statutory exception to automatic disqualification relates to the
expression of views in academic writing that might otherwise be thought to
indicate a bias.88 Interestingly, the exception for academic writing is itself the
result of a recusal decision by the Constitutional Court. The 1966 Leibholz
decision involved a challenge to legislation that established state-sponsored party
financing. Leibholz was a professor of law at Göttingen and Bruge. He had served
on the Constitutional Court for fifteen years. Between the oral hearing and the
release of the judgment, he presented a paper at a constitutional law conference
in which he indicated a preference for state party financing. Upon application
by two fringe parties, the Court decided to disqualify Leibholz. In its decision,
the Court indicated that the issue was not actual partiality but a “concern about
partiality” (Besorgnis der Befangenheit). It stated that the test was whether a person
without involvement in the process, in a reasonable manner appreciating the
entire context, would have cause to doubt the impartiality and objective stance
of the judge.89 The legislature disagreed with the conclusion of the Court and
responded to the ruling by adding an academic writing exception into Article 18.
87. BverfGG, supra note 62, § 18(2)(3) (“Involvement for the purposes of section 1 no. 2 shall
not include … participating in the legislative procedure … .”).
88. This issue is peculiar to the German context. The public law professoriate has been a primary
recruitment ground for judges on the Constitutional Court. Leading constitutional scholars
make up the vast majority of appointees. Since appointments are presently subject to a
non-renewable twelve-year term, the professorial appointment may bracket the judicial
one. While judges do not teach during their judicial tenure, they frequently continue
to participate in academic life including presenting at conferences. As a result, it is very
common that judges would comment on any number of constitutional issues, many of which
might come before the court during their tenure there.
89. BVerfGE 20, 26 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany).
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In addition to statutory rules for automatic disqualification and express
rules for situations that do not warrant recusal, a third element common to
all three statutory schemes that might be useful to consider in the Canadian
context is a set of procedural provisions. These provisions address issues such
as limitation periods and waivers, how to bring recusal motions, determining
who hears the motion, and delineating appeal and self-disqualification processes.
Generally, an application for recusal must be brought early in the proceeding:
In civil court, the motion must be brought before the moving party makes its first
appearance; in the Constitutional Court, prior to the oral hearing on the merits;
and in criminal court, prior to the examination of the first defence witness.
Early motions are facilitated by permitting a request for naming judges and lay
adjudicators prior to trial.90
The application must be brought in the court seized of the matter and is
typically heard by a panel of that court, in most circumstances excluding the
judge in relation to whom the application is brought. Where the issue arises
because a judge formally identifies a reason that might give rise to a reasonable
apprehension of bias, in most circumstances the recusal motion is also heard by a
panel of the same court excluding the judge. A notable exception to the rule that
a panel of the same court excluding the judge will hear the recusal motion can be
found in the criminal rules of procedure. The trial judge himself or herself may
determine whether the application is timely and, if appropriate, dismiss it for that
reason. A panel not including the trial judge decides all other recusal motions.
Dismissing a recusal motion on the basis of a finding that it was brought for
purely tactical reasons has to be made by a unanimous panel, again excluding the
trial judge. The decision to disqualify or recuse is not subject to appeal, but an
unsuccessful recusal motion may be appealed as part of an appeal on the merits.

IV. AN OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER
THE QUEBEC CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The rules governing judicial disqualification in the province of Quebec differ
historically from those in other Canadian provinces because the Quebec Code of

90. StPO, supra note 59, s 24(3).
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Civil Procedure91 codifies the grounds for judicial disqualification. Luc Huppé has
shown that until the 1970s, Quebec law employed a framework for determining
when judges were disqualified that was quite distinct from the approach employed
in the rest of Canada. Under this earlier Quebecois approach, the grounds for
disqualification found in the Code of Civil Procedure were treated as the exclusive
basis for judicial disqualification and were interpreted in a restrictive manner
that was consistent with their origins in French law.92 These grounds were not
linked conceptually to the common law concept of a reasonable apprehension of
bias, though there was an obvious overlap between the enumerated grounds and
situations that would be regarded as giving rise to disqualification at common
law. Huppé suggests that the enactment of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights
and Freedoms [Quebec Charter] in 1975, and in particular its guarantee in section
23 of “a right to a full and equal, public and fair hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal,” created a conceptual tension in thinking about
judicial impartiality in Quebec because the courts interpreted the concept of
impartiality in section 23 in a manner that reflected the common law.93 Quebec
courts began to treat the grounds for disqualification contained in the Code as
non-exclusive, with the result that Quebec judges were subject to disqualification
in circumstances that would give rise to a “reasonable apprehension of bias” even
if these circumstances did not fall within the grounds enumerated in the Code.94

91. New Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 23. The National Assembly of Quebec enacted
the new Code of Civil Procedure in February of 2014, but it was not proclaimed into force
until January 1, 2016. For ease of reference, we will describe this as the “new Code of Civil
Procedure.” Most of the provisions dealing with judicial disqualification in the Code that were
in force prior to the coming into force of the new Code were enacted in 2002, and we will
describe these as the “2002 disqualification provisions.” SQ 2002, c 7 [2002 disqualification
provisions]. For the most part, the Code provisions dealing with judicial disqualification
prior to 2002 were enacted in 1965, and we will describe these as the “1965 disqualification
provisions.” SC 1965, c 80 [1965 disqualification provisions].
92. Luc Huppé, “La transformation du modèle québécois de récusation des juges” (2012) 46
Revue juridique Thémis 209 at 212-19. See e.g. Kruger Inc v Kruco Inc, [1987] RDJ 622 (Qc
CA) at paras 8-20, aff’g on other grounds [1987] RJQ 1071 (Qc Sup Ct). On this view of
the law, reasonable apprehension of bias could be asserted as a ground of appeal but was not
a basis for disqualifying a judge from hearing the case at first instance.
93. Huppé, supra note 92 at 217-219. See also 2747-3174 Québec Inc v Québec (Régie des permis
d’alcool), [1996] 3 SCR 919 at paras 44-45, 140 DLR (4th) 577.
94. See Droit de la Famille - 1559, [1993] RJQ 625 at paras 11-12, 21-22, 101 DLR
(4th) 345 (Qc CA).
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The Code’s 1965 disqualification provisions95 contained nine grounds for
disqualification in section 234 and a tenth ground in section 235. Section 234
stated that “[a] judge may be recused . . .” on any of the enumerated grounds
whereas section 235 stated that “[a] judge is disqualified if he or his consort is
interested in the action.”96 Five of the grounds of disqualification addressed
situations in which the judge or a close relative had a financial or other personal
interest in the outcome of the litigation.97 Two concerned situations where the
judge had an association with a litigant or counsel.98 The other three concerned the
judge’s association with the case in a non-judicial capacity,99 judicial antagonism
towards a party,100 and judicial interest in favouring a party.101
The 1965 version of the Code also codified the procedure for recusal
and disqualification. Judges had an affirmative obligation to make a written
declaration of facts that might lead to their disqualification.102 If a judge chose not
to recuse of his or her own motion, a party could make a motion for the judge’s
disqualification within ten days of the judge’s declaration or at any other time
provided the party was diligent in raising this possibility once the relevant facts
came to their attention.103 If a party made a motion that the judge be disqualified,
the judge had ten days to declare whether the facts alleged were true, and then the
motion would be heard by a judge other than the judge whose disqualification
was being sought.104 If the motion was upheld the judge was disqualified and a
new judge would be assigned; if the motion was dismissed the judge was obliged
to hear the case.105 Section 242 of the Code allowed parties to waive their right to
have a judge disqualified, except in situations falling under the disqualification

95. These provisions are found principally in the 1965 version of the Code. SC 1965, c 80,
ss 234-42. There were, however, some relatively minor amendments between 1965 and 2002.
96. This version of s 235 was inserted in amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1977.
SQ 1977, c 73, s 8 [emphasis added].
97. Ibid, ss 234(1), 234(2), 234(4), 234(7), 235.
98. Ibid, ss 234(6), 234(9).
99. Ibid, s 234(3).
100. Ibid, s 234(5).
101. Ibid, s 234(8).
102. Ibid, s 236.
103. Ibid, s 237.
104. Ibid, s 283.
105. Ibid, s 241.
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requirement of section 235 of the Code,106 but also gave judges who were subject
to disqualification the right to recuse themselves even if the parties did not seek
their disqualification.
In 2002, the Quebec National Assembly made two significant modifications
to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure governing judicial disqualification.
First, the grounds for disqualification were modified by adding the words “in
particular” to the opening words of section 234 (thereby indicating that the
enumerated list of grounds of disqualification was not exhaustive) and by adding
to the enumerated grounds section 234(10), pursuant to which the judge may
be disqualified “if there is reasonable cause to fear that the judge will not be
impartial.”107 Second, and of equal importance, the procedure for determining
whether or not a judge is disqualified was altered significantly. Section 238 was
modified to require a motion for the judge’s disqualification to be disposed of
by the judge responsible for hearing the case rather than by another judge.108
This decision was made subject to appeal in accordance with the rules governing
interlocutory appeals.109 Judges were still entitled to recuse themselves of their
own motion, but they had to provide a written statement of the basis for doing
so in the record and the Chief Judge or Chief Justice had to be so informed.110
The legislation also added a provision that requires the clerk of the court to notify
the Chief Judge or Chief Justice of any case in which the hearing is postponed
because of a judge’s decision to recuse himself himself or herself.111
As noted above, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure governing
judicial disqualification have been modified again by the coming into force on 1
January 2016 of the new Code that was enacted by the National Assembly and
that received Royal Assent on 20 February 2014.112 The overall thrust of the
disqualification provisions of the new Code is to simplify the rules governing
disqualification and make them more understandable to litigants, especially those
who are self-represented, but there are a number of changes of substance. Section
106. This limitation on the right of waiver is analogous to the limitations on waiver at the
federal level in the United States. 28 USC § 455(e) permits judges to accept waiver by the
parties of their right to disqualify the judge if the basis for disqualification is the general
disqualification rule found in § 455(a), but not if the basis for disqualification is one of
the grounds for automatic disqualification enumerated in § 455(b), except in unusual
circumstances set out in § 455(f ). 28 USC, supra note 27, § 455(a)-(f ).
107. 2002 disqualification provisions, supra note 91, s 47.
108. Ibid, s 50.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid, s 48 (amending s 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
111. Ibid, s 51 (replacing s 240 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
112. SQ 2014, c 1, ss 201-205.
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201 of the new Code is analogous to section 236 of the 2002 disqualification
provisions. It imposes an obligation on a judge who is aware of a basis for his
or her disqualification to make a declaration to this effect and be replaced as
the presiding judge and an obligation on parties who become aware of a
basis for the judge’s disqualification to make a declaration without delay. The
significant textual difference between section 201 of the new Code and section
236 of the 2002 disqualification provisions is that the obligations under the
new Code are triggered by “serious reasons to question the judge’s impartiality”
whereas under the 2002 provisions the obligations are engaged by awareness of
a “ground of recusation.” This new terminology is repeated in section 202 of the
new Code, which parallels section 234 of the 2002 disqualification provisions
and identifies the bases upon which a judge may be disqualified. The opening
words of section 202 of the new Code are: “The following situations, among
others, may be considered serious reasons for questioning a judge’s impartiality
and for seeking the judge’s recusation.”113 Six subsections follow, which rephrase
and to some extent modify the grounds of disqualification found in subsections
234(1)—234(9) of the 2002 disqualification provisions.114 Section 203 of the
new Code mirrors section 235 of the 2002 disqualification provisions. It deals
with situations where the judge (or the judge’s spouse) has an interest in the
case, and it also uses the mandatory term “is disqualified” rather than a phrase
like “may be considered a basis for disqualification.” The procedural regime for
113. New Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 23, s 202.
114. Ibid, ss 202(1)-(5); Code of Civil Procedure, ss 234(1)-(9). S 202(1) provides for
disqualification where the judge is a spouse or close relative of one of the parties or their
lawyer, thereby combining and slightly modifying ss 234(1) and 234(9) of the 2002
provisions. S 202(2) replaces s 234(2) of the 2002 provisions in providing for disqualification
where the judge is “a party to a proceeding pertaining to an issue similar to the one before
the judge for determination.” S 202(3) rewords part of s 234(3) of the 2002 provisions and
provides for disqualification where a judges has “given advice or an opinion on the dispute”
or has “previously dealt with the dispute as arbitrator or mediator.” S 202(4) provides for
disqualification on the basis of “the judge having represented one of the parties,” thereby
replacing the aspect of s 234(3) of the 2002 provisions that provided for disqualification
if “the judge has acted as attorney for any of the parties … .” S 202(5) provides for
disqualification where the judge is “a shareholder or an officer of a legal person or a member
of a partnership or an association or another group not endowed with juridical personality
that is a party to the proceeding.” This provision modifies elements of ss 234(6) and 234(7)
of the 2002 provisions. Finally, s 202(6) provides for disqualification on the basis of “a
serious conflict existing between the judge and one of the parties or the lawyer of one of the
parties, or threats or insults having been uttered between them during the proceeding or in
the year preceding the application for recusation.” This provision modifies s 234(5) of the
2002 provisions.
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dealing with recusal found in sections 236—241 of the 2002 disqualification
provisions is substantially retained in sections 204 and 205 of the new Code. The
new Code removes section 242, which addressed the issue of waiver, but a party’s
option to waive the right to seek recusal is embedded in the text of section 201.
It is noteworthy that the new Code eliminates the ground of disqualification
found in subsection 234(10) of the 2002 provisions (“there is reasonable cause to
fear that the judge will not be impartial”) and instead positions “serious reasons
for questioning a judge’s impartiality” as a general organizing principle in the
opening words of section 202.115 While it remains to be seen how Quebec courts
will interpret these words, in our view there is a strong likelihood that they will
be interpreted in a manner that is very similar to the approach to the “reasonable
apprehension of bias” test taken by courts in other Canadian provinces. As noted
above, the new disqualification regime is presumably designed to satisfy the
impartiality requirements of section 23 of the Quebec Charter, which are based
on the common law standard of impartiality. It is therefore reasonable to assume
that section 202 will be interpreted in a manner that provides standards of
disqualification that are at least as stringent as those required by the common law.
Indeed, it is worth noting that at least some of the grounds for disqualification
enumerated in subsections 202(1)—202(6) of the new Code appear to be
somewhat broader than the grounds for disqualification under the common law
as it is applied in other Canadian provinces. For example, subsection 202(4)
treats “the judge having represented one of the parties” as a situation that “may
be considered [a] serious [reason] for questioning a judge’s impartiality.” At
common law, the fact that a judge had represented one of the parties might
be the basis for finding a “reasonable apprehension of bias,” but in the absence
of other considerations this rationale for disqualification would dissipate after
a cooling-off period. Similarly, on its face, subsection 202(5) provides that a
judge who is a shareholder of a corporation that is a party to a proceeding would
be disqualified, whereas at common law there is significant authority for the
proposition that a judge who owns shares in a publicly traded corporation that is
a party to a proceeding is only disqualified if the outcome of the litigation could
influence the value of the judge’s shares.116 It is possible that the use of the term
“may” in the opening words of section 202 will give Quebec judges the flexibility

115. Ibid, s 202.
116. See Ebner, supra note 32; Bernert v Absa Bank Ltd¸ (2011) [2010] ZACC 28, (3) SA 92,
CCT 37/10 (S Afr Const Ct), citing Ebner, supra note 32 at paras 54-57, 67-68.
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to avoid automatic disqualification in situations falling within the scope of
subsections 202(4) and 202(5) that would not require recusal at common law.117

V. POTENTIAL RULE-BASED SOLUTIONS FOR
DISQUALIFICATION ISSUES IN COMMON LAW
JURISDICTIONS
The statutory regimes for judicial disqualification in the United States, Germany,
and Quebec all use slightly different words to express the general principle that
judges should not hear cases in which their impartiality can reasonably be called
into question, and they share this principle with jurisdictions that use the common
law to govern judicial disqualification. The challenge for all these jurisdictions,
therefore, is to define with greater precision which types of challenges to a judge’s
impartiality the law will regard as “reasonable” and therefore acceptable and,
correspondingly, which types of challenges will not be regarded as acceptable.
Despite the admonition by common law courts that the application of the
“reasonable apprehension of bias” test is fact- and context-specific, common law
decisions have been successful at identifying a range of limitations on the types of
challenges to a judge’s impartiality that are likely to succeed. Indeed, the English
Court of Appeal’s decision in Locabail is best understood as a self-conscious effort
on the part of the court to reassert the boundaries for successful challenges to the
perception of judicial impartiality in the wake of the House of Lords decision
in Pinochet.118 Statutory jurisdictions such as Germany, the United States,
and, to a lesser extent, Quebec go beyond articulating a statutory standard of
reasonable apprehension of bias to make rules about situations that do and do
not warrant recusal.
We argue in this part of the article that there would be merit in using rules
rather than common law decisions to establish the boundaries for successful
challenges to judicial impartiality in a number of areas. We do not suggest that
it would be appropriate for common law jurisdictions to simply copy the rules
employed in the United States or Germany or even for other Canadian provinces
117. By way of analogy, in Dufour v 99516 Canada Inc, the Quebec Court of Appeal focused on
whether the trial judge’s relationship with one of the parties would give rise to a reasonable
apprehension of bias, and decided that it would not, rather than focusing on whether the
relationship was one that strictly fell within the scope of one of the grounds enumerated
under s 234 of the Code’s 1965 disqualification provisions. Dufour, supra note 23; 1965
disqualification provisions, supra note 91, s 234.
118. See Kate Malleson, “Safeguarding Judicial Impartiality” (2002) 22 Legal Studies
53 at 53-54, 62.
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to adopt the Quebec regime. Further, any rules should be specific to the court
or administrative tribunal. As the German rules illustrate, the regulatory regime
should be tailored to the jurisdictional scope of the court. While there are
common themes in all the statutory regimes, there are also significant differences
among them both at a structural level and in matters of detail. These differences,
as well as the similarities, are instructive as we consider the role that rules might
be able to play in supplementing common law principles governing judicial
disqualification.
In our view, there are several reasons to believe that statutory rules will be
helpful in supplementing the common law “reasonable apprehension of bias”
test. The first is that, as our empirical research suggests, decisional law typically
under-represents the instances in which judges recuse themselves, so the case law
is likely to give at best a partial view of existing judicial practice. Second, there is
reason to believe that informal practices concerning recusal are not particularly
well understood by many members of the judiciary, with the result that they
are likely to be applied inconsistently. This can cause unnecessary redistribution
of workload among judges and potentially unnecessary delay to parties. Both
might be alleviated if a formal set of standards were articulated in the form of
a rule. Third, reliance on ill-understood and inconsistently applied informal
understandings of when it is and is not appropriate for a judge to be recused
in marginal situations can cause difficulty for parties and their counsel. The
existence of clearer rules governing when a judge is or is not disqualified may
prevent counsel from wasting time advancing arguments for recusal when the
application has no reasonable chance of success and may at the same time increase
the confidence of parties and counsel in advancing valid objections to the judge’s
participation. Fourth, there are, at least in some circumstances, compelling
reasons to create procedural rules that give judges the explicit authority to refer
the decision about whether or not disqualification is required to another judge.
Fifth, there are circumstances in which considerations of efficiency or other
requirements of our system of adjudication enable judges to sit notwithstanding
what appears to be an objective basis for arguing that the judge is predisposed
in one manner or another. One example is situations where arguments are raised
that a judge’s advocacy or writings prior to judicial appointment are indicative
of partiality.119 In at least some of these situations it may be helpful for a judge
to be able to point to a rule authorizing him or her to sit, rather than to have to
explain to an objecting party that there is no reasonable basis for perceiving that
the judge is anything but impartial. Finally, there are some situations in which
119. See Hughes & Bryden, “Refining the Test,” supra note 16 at 180-81, 189.
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it may be useful to establish a bright-line standard for when disqualification is
required, since the choice of any particular place to draw the line is somewhat
arbitrary. Requiring individual judges to guess where that line ought to be
drawn on the basis of little or no information places them in a difficult if not
impossible situation. The best example of this type of situation is the cooling-off
period for judges to hear cases argued by members of their former law firms or
involving their former clients. As demonstrated by the experience of the German
Constitutional Court and for reasons discussed in more detail below, there are
good grounds for thinking that a cooling-off period is desirable but it is not
obvious what the appropriate length of that cooling-off period ought to be, and
a formal rule is both a more effective and a more transparent way of making that
determination than an informal local practice.
As indicated at the outset of the article, we believe that there are three
substantive areas and one procedural area in which rules would be particularly
well-suited for giving guidance on judicial disqualification. They are: (1)
professional relationships between justice personnel and litigation participants;
(2) prior judicial consideration in the cause or in related litigation; (3) extrajudicial
writings suggesting a predisposition; and (4) procedures for recusal motions.
We will address each in turn. We refrain from offering draft rules because they
need to be tailored to each court or tribunal, but we offer what might be thought
of as general drafting instructions at the end of each section.
A. PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH FORMER COLLEAGUES AND
CLIENTS

Since all Canadian judges were once lawyers,120 it is normal that they will have
professional relationships with former clients and with former colleagues from
their law firms. Some of these relationships may be sufficiently close that a judge
would never feel comfortable hearing a case involving the other person—for
example, a case argued by a former colleague who is a close personal friend or
involving a client with whom the judge worked closely for years in his or her
capacity as a lawyer. In addition, the Canadian jurisprudence strongly supports
the view that if a judge was personally involved in a matter during his or her

120. This is a common feature of judicial systems based on the English model, but it is not a
universal feature of legal systems around the world. For example, the judicial system in
Germany and other European countries draws its members from persons who were trained as
adjudicators rather than from the ranks of the legal profession.
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career as a lawyer, the judge should not sit on a case that involves that matter.121
This is not an ironclad rule since the Supreme Court of Canada has concluded
that if the matter was sufficiently far in the past and the judge’s involvement
sufficiently tangential that he or she has no recollection of it, it can be permissible
for the judge to sit.122 As noted in Part I, above, the advice given to Canadian
judges is that the judge should adopt “a ‘cooling-off’ period, often established by
local tradition at 2, 3 or 5 years and in any event at least as long as there is any
indebtedness between the firm and the judge” in situations where the professional
relationship with a former colleague or client is not one that places the judge in a
conflict of interest. In this context, conflicts of interest are confined to situations
where the judge was personally involved with the matter in dispute, the firm was
involved in the dispute while the judge was still a member of the firm, or close
personal relationships were in play.123
As discussed earlier, the problem with a cooling-off period established by
local tradition is that the tradition may not be passed on effectively to judges,
and it is even less likely that counsel and self-represented litigants will be aware
of the tradition. The fact that local tradition is variously described as setting
the cooling-off period at two, three, or five years suggests that the choice of
any particular time frame is less important than the fact that there be a shared
understanding of what the time frame is, and this in our view lends itself to being
established through a rule.
None of the German, Quebecois, or American federal disqualification
rules provide for cooling-off periods, and they take quite different approaches
to disqualification based on relationships with former clients and professional
colleagues. Subsection 234(3) of the 2002 disqualification provisions of the
Quebec Code of Civil Procedure identifies the fact that “the judge has acted for
one of the parties” as a potential ground of disqualification without reference
121. See e.g. Committee for Justice and Liberty v Canada (National Energy Board), [1978] 1 SCR
369, 68 DLR (3d) 716; R v Catcheway, 2000 SCC 33, [2001] SCR 838; Barrett v Glynn,
2001 NFCA 70, 207 Nfld & PEIR 213.
122. See Wewaykum, supra note 3.
123. Canadian Judicial Council, supra note 10 at 52. While the choice of any particular
cooling-off period is somewhat arbitrary, our preference is for a period at the shorter end
rather than the longer end of the range. In circumstances in which a judge harbours lingering
doubts about his or her ability to be impartial in adjudicating a matter involving a former
colleague or client, it is always open for the judge to recuse notwithstanding the fact that the
cooling-off period has elapsed. On the other hand, a judge is not in a position to abridge the
cooling-off period if the judge is satisfied that there is no actual basis for concern about his or
her ability to adjudicate impartiality, since this would be inconsistent with the rationale for
establishing the cooling-off period in the first place.
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to the passage of time and without qualifying the lawyer-client relationship
to the matter currently before the court,124 and this approach is continued in
subsection 202(4) of the new Code. Neither the 2002 provisions nor the new
Code lists the relationship with members of the judge’s former law firm as an
explicit ground of disqualification.125 While German disqualification rules
are absolute with respect to adjudicating matters where the judge has acted
as counsel, they are silent on whether recusal is necessary if a former client or
colleague appears before the judge on an unrelated matter. For example, criminal
court judges are disqualified if they have “acted in the case as an official of the
public prosecution office, as a police officer, as attorney of the aggrieved person
or as defence counsel.”126 Similarly, a civil court judge is barred in “all matters in
which he was appointed as attorney of record or as a person providing assistance
to a party, or in which he is or was authorised to make an appearance as a legal
representative of a party.”127 By implication through omission, German judges are
not barred from hearing cases brought by, against, or involving a former client
in an unrelated matter at any time. As is clearly apparent from our discussion
of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, the mere fact that a German
judge had a prior association with a law firm that is now representing a client
before the judge is not, without more, reason for recusal. As American federal
practice does not explicitly disqualify judges for hearing cases involving former
clients as distinct from hearing cases in which they were personally involved in a
non-judicial capacity, these jurisdictions offer somewhat limited guidance as to
the precise content of a rule governing cooling-off periods.128 Similarly, American
federal rules governing disqualification because of a judge’s association with
124. 2002 disqualification provisions, supra note 91, s 234(3). This section also lists the
fact that “the judge has given advice on the matter in dispute” as a potential ground of
disqualification, which suggests that the fact that the judge has acted for one of the parties in
the past is a ground of disqualification regardless of whether that representation took place in
the context of the matter currently before the court.
125. Ibid, s 234(9)-(10). The relationship with lawyers is a ground of disqualification under s
234(9) of the 2002 disqualification provisions if “the judge is the spouse of or is related or
allied to the attorney or counsel or to the partner of any of them” but the Code makes no
reference to former professional colleagues and this relationship would have to be assessed
under the general ground of disqualification found in s 234(10). Section 202(1) of the new
Code takes a similar approach to disqualification based on the judge’s relationship to a lawyer
of one of the parties. New Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 23, s 202(1).
126. StPO, supra note 59, s 22 [emphasis added].
127. German Code of Civil Procedure [ZPO], s 41(4), online: <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html>.
128. See e.g. 28 USC, supra note 27, § 455(b)(2)-(3); StPO, supra note 59, ss 22(4)-(5);
ibid, ss 41(4)-(6).
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a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced refer only to situations in
which the “lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served during
such association as a lawyer concerning the matter.”129 On the other hand, the
provisions of subsection 170.1(2)(B) of the California Code of Civil Procedure
offer a model for a two-year cooling-off period that could be adopted by rule in
Canada or in other common law jurisdictions.
In sum, we recommend an express rule that judges may hear cases involving
lawyers in their former law firms as long as there is no further indebtedness
and more than two years have passed since the appointment of the judge.
Similarly, we recommend a two-year cooling-off period for former clients in
unrelated matters.
B. PRIOR JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT WITH LITIGANTS

One of the areas of recusal law described by judges as raising the most difficult
issues is what is sometimes described as the repeat customer phenomenon.
For purposes of Canadian law, two situations need to be distinguished:
(1) unrelated prior litigation and (2) related litigation or interlocutory matters in
the same litigation.
As regards the first situation, in none of the jurisdictions under consideration
is the mere fact that the judge has encountered one of the litigants in the
course of presiding over another, unrelated matter a basis for disqualification.
Canadian case law suggests that greater care must be taken where a judge has
made an adverse credibility finding against a party in a previous case, but even
in these circumstances disqualification is not required in all cases. Rather, the
issue is whether the findings were expressed in sufficiently strong terms that a
reasonable person would doubt the ability of the judge to adjudicate the present
cases fairly upon the evidence adduced before him or her in a subsequent
unrelated proceeding.
The second situation covers previous encounters with litigants in related
litigation or other stages of the same litigation. Again, it is common ground
among the jurisdictions under consideration that the mere fact that a judge was
involved in some prior stage of the proceeding does not give rise to a reasonable
apprehension of bias. Examples include breach hearings following sentencing

129. 28 USC, supra note 27, § 455(b)(2).
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with conditions, bail hearings followed by the trial on the merits, preliminary
motions, voir dire rulings, and case-managed litigation.130
In Canada, the jurisprudence establishes that a judge may sit even if the
judge found against a party in a prior unrelated proceeding or on an interlocutory
issue. In our view, the basic rule that a prior encounter between judge and litigant
does not, without more, warrant recusal could easily be codified. Its extension,
that an adverse ruling in an interlocutory issue also does not warrant recusal, may
be more problematic. This is because the manner in which the adverse ruling is
expressed influences the recusal analysis. Whether judicial commentary strays
into the forbidden zone is too contextual and nuanced to be readily captured in
a bright-line rule.
As regards prior judicial dealings in the same or related proceedings, at least
three distinct problems arise with some frequency. The first is the perception of
the litigant, particularly one who is self-represented, that any prior finding of
a judge vis-à-vis that litigant is prejudicial in terms of the ultimate outcome of
the litigation. The second is the concern that evidence that does not form part
of the record will contaminate the proceeding. The third is that remarks made
by the judge in the context of fact findings or characterizations of the argument
advanced by counsel or the litigant are seen as prejudging the matter. The first
concern is particularly susceptible to bright-line rule making.
Efficient use of judicial resources generally suggests that a judge who is
already familiar with the matter should be the judge dealing with it in its entirety.
Additionally, the risk for inconsistent fact findings is reduced if only one judge
remains seized of the matter. These reasons are sufficiently important that the
feelings of the litigants will usually have to give way to them. Thus, the question
is rarely whether a judge should be recused merely because he or she has been
involved in the matter before, but how best to communicate to litigants that,
despite their misgivings, the proper administration of justice demands that the
judge continue to sit. One of the advantages of a rule-based approach is that
the judge can point to the rule in explaining to the litigant, particularly the
self-represented litigant, that recusal is not appropriate.
130. The phenomenon of judicial dispute resolution (including settlement conferencing and
mediation) should be distinguished for these purposes from case management. In some
jurisdictions, the rules structuring this phenomenon forbid judges who have engaged in
dispute resolution efforts from subsequently adjudicating the matter if no settlement is
reached. See e.g. British Columbia Supreme Court Family Rules, BC Reg 169/2009, ss 7-1(17),
7-2(3); New Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 23, s 165. Other jurisdictions permit the
judge to continue and adjudicate the case, but only with the agreement of the judge and all
of the parties. (See, e.g. Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010, s 4.21.)
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In all three jurisdictions we have examined, the sole blanket exception to the
general rule that a judge may sit in cases despite prior judicial involvement is the
participation of a judge in an appellate consideration of his or her own decision.
In the German context, the specific mention of this exception makes clear that
other forms of prior judicial involvement do not attract disqualification. The
equivalent limitation is also codified at the federal level in the United States131 and
in a number of Canadian jurisdictions.132 Nevertheless, the leading United States
Supreme Court decision on the question of whether prior judicial involvement in
a case attracts disqualification, Liteky v United States,133 does not rely on this fact
as a reason for permitting judges to sit in cases of prior judicial involvement other
than one’s own appeal, and we are not aware of any Canadian case that relies on
comparable Canadian statutes in support of this proposition. This may suggest
that the place of codification is important for its interpretation. In Germany,
the bar against considering one’s own decision at the appellate level is included
in the general rules surrounding disqualification. In Canada, the same rules are
dispersed through, inter alia, rules of court, the Criminal Code, and various
enabling statutes establishing appellate courts. Section 551.1 of the Criminal
Code provides that “the appointment of a judge as the case management judge
does not prevent him or her from becoming the judge who hears the evidence on
the merits,” while section 551.4 provides for the procedure to be applied when
the case management judge is also the trial judge. This recent amendment to the
Criminal Code is a good example of how Canadian statute law already includes
some rules that clarify the circumstances when a judge does not need to recuse.134
Similarly, British Columbia’s family court rules allow the case management judge
to remain seized of further applications in the cause but preclude the settlement
conference judge from presiding over the trial.135
In short, we recommend enactment of an express rule that prior judicial
involvement with a litigant is not, without more, a basis for recusal regardless of
whether the litigation is related or not.
131. 28 USC, supra note 27, § 47. The section reads, “No judge shall hear or determine an appeal
from the decision of a case or issue tried by him.”
132. See e.g. Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 28(1); New Brunswick Judicature Act, RSNB
1973, c J-2, s 8(7); Alberta Court of Appeal Act, RSA, c C-30, s 11.
133. (1994) 510 US 540, 114 S Ct 1147.
134. SC 2011, c 16, s 4.
135. British Columbia Supreme Court Family Rules, supra note 130. S 165 of the new Code of
Civil Procedure also indicates that a judge who presides over a settlement conference can take
appropriate case management measures but may not “subsequently try the case or decide any
incidental application.” New Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 23, s 165.
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C. EXTRAJUDICIAL WRITINGS

Canadian courts have generally been reluctant to disqualify judges simply
because of their extrajudicial writings, be they related to advocacy, advice to
government, political activity, or academic commentary. A prominent example
of this reluctance is the decision of Justice Bastarache of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Arsenault-Cameron.136 The case involved minority language rights
and Justice Bastarache had written extensively on the issue when he was a law
professor. He had also been counsel for minority language rights groups prior
to his appointment to the bench. When the Prince Edward Island case came to
the Court, counsel for the province brought a motion for his recusal. The Court
took the opportunity to clarify the procedure appropriate for recusal and denied
the motion. The decision is not only in line with Canadian jurisprudence but
also with the practice of comparator courts of last resort.137 It is nevertheless
easy to see why counsel might have been concerned. As in the situation of the
self-represented litigant re-encountering a judge, the issue is not so much whether
recusal is appropriate but how to communicate that the judge should continue
to sit. One of the animating reasons for adopting a “reasonable apprehension
of bias” test in preference over requiring proof of actual bias is that both the
presence and the absence of an open mind are difficult to prove. There is a reason
why the issue arises most commonly in appellate and constitutional courts. These
courts have tended to recruit more routinely from the professoriate than do the
trial courts, although recent Canadian experience seems to suggest an increased
trend towards appointing law professors to provincial courts.138
In all of these cases, then, there is reason to consider whether bright-line
rules might be better suited to promote confidence in the justice system and give
136. Arsenault-Cameron v Prince Edward Island, [1999] 3 SCR 851, 201 Nfld & PEIR 1;
Arsenault-Cameron v Prince Edward Island, 2000 SCC 1, [2000] 1 SCR 3.
137. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court confirmed that in addition to extrajudicial writing,
judicial involvement in community organizations does not generally give rise to a reasonable
apprehension of bias. Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v Yukon (Attorney
General), 2015 SCC 25 at para 62, [2015] 2 SCR 282.
138. It is interesting to note that in an article entitled “Some Problems with Extrajudicial
Writing,” Susan Bartie and John Gava argue that judges should not engage in scholarly
writing on legal topics after they have been appointed to the bench out of a concern that
such writings will give rise to a reasonable apprehension that the judge has predetermined
legal issues that may arise in a case that comes before the judge for adjudication. “Some
Problems with Extrajudicial Writing” (2012) 34 Sydney L Rev 637. Bartie and Gava draw
a distinction between scholarly writing that takes place before the judge’s appointment,
which should not reasonably be treated as giving rise to a basis for disqualification, and the
extrajudicial writings of sitting judges (ibid at 653-54).
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comfort to litigants, or at least avoid unnecessary and ultimately unsuccessful
recusal motions. Inspiration might be taken from the German Constitutional
Court, despite the fact that the institutional practices of that court are greatly at
variance with the Canadian situation. As discussed in Part III, above, judges are
appointed to the court for a single tenure of twelve years, they overwhelmingly
come from the legal academy, and they routinely continue to participate in
academic conferences and publications throughout their judicial tenure. Given
that institutional design, it is foreseeable that the situation in Arsenault-Cameron
would occur with much higher frequency in that court absent a statutory rule to
the contrary. The Constitutional Court Act therefore usefully provides that neither
advice to government, nor involvement in the drafting process of legislation, nor
academic writing gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
We recommend that rules of court provide that neither writing nor speech
making prior to judicial appointment disqualify a judge, even if he or she
advocates a position on a contentious issue. We note that this would not relieve
judges of the obligation to consider whether they are able to approach with an
open mind an issue they have spoken or written about.
D. PROCEDURAL RULES

In most parts of Canada, there is no special procedure by which parties may seek
the disqualification of a judge.139 It is common for judges to recuse themselves
of their own motion if they believe that they are disqualified, and our research
suggests that this is the most common procedural context in which recusal
decisions are made.140 If a party wishes to seek a judge’s recusal, the normal
practice is for a party to make a motion using the ordinary rules of motion
practice.141 It is also relatively common for judges who are unsure about whether
or not they should recuse themselves to seek submissions from the parties.142
139. As noted above, Quebec is exceptional in this respect.
140. See Bryden & Hughes, “Tip of the Iceberg,” supra note 4 at 576-77.
141. See Bryden, “Legal Principles,” supra note 6 at 590-94. Geoffrey Lester has suggested that
a preferable practice would be for counsel to make an informal application from the bar
table with appropriate supporting materials, but he acknowledges that the use of a motion
is the common practice. Geoffrey Lester, “Disqualifying Judges for Bias and Reasonable
Apprehension of Bias: Some Problems of Practice and Procedure” (2001) 24 Advocates
Q 326 at 342-46.
142. See e.g., Lambert, supra note 47. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal has advised that,
in these situations, the proper practice is for the judge to seek submissions and render the
decision personally rather than to seek a waiver from the parties or indicate that the judge
will automatically recuse if the party raises an objection.
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While this procedure works tolerably well, it does present certain difficulties that
could be addressed through the use of procedural rules.
The first difficulty concerns the fact that the judge whose impartiality
is being questioned makes the decision about whether or not he or she is
disqualified. There are a number of practical reasons why it may be desirable in
some circumstances to have the judge whose disqualification is at issue make the
determination, at least at first instance. One is that the judge is in the best position
to know subjectively if there is a real basis for concern about his or her ability
to decide impartially, and in those situations the judge ought to be in a position
to decide that it is inappropriate for him or her to sit.143 A second reason is
that automatically referring the matter to another judge might encourage parties
to make unmeritorious applications for tactical reasons, for example to create
delay. A third is that there are situations in which the basis for disqualification
arises unexpectedly, for example if a judge recognizes a social relationship with
a witness when the witness first appears in court partway through a lengthy
hearing. Referral in these circumstances may cause delay that is not in the best
interests of either party. As we indicated in Part IV, above, prior to 2002 sections
238—41 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure required applications for recusal
to be heard by a different judge than the judge whose recusal was being sought,
but when the National Assembly amended the rules governing recusal in 2002,
it established a procedural regime in which motions for recusal are heard by the
judge seized of the case.144
143. This view is consistent with the conclusions of Canadian Judicial Council in its report of
a complaint concerning the recusal of Justice Jean-Guy Boilard in the midst of a long and
complicated criminal trial after he received a letter from the Canadian Judicial Council
criticizing his treatment of one of the lawyers in a related case. The Council observed that it
is the individual responsibility of every judge to determine whether there are circumstances
that prevent him or her from continuing to hear a case, and in the absence of evidence of
bad faith, there is no basis for criticism of that decision. Canadian Judicial Council, Report
of the Canadian Judicial Council to the Minister of Justice of Canada under s. 65(1) of the
Judges Act concerning Mr. Justice Jean-Guy Boilard of the Superior Court of Quebec (Ottawa:
Canadian Judicial Council, 2003) at 3-4, online: <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/
conduct_inq_boilard_ReportIC_200312_en.pdf>.
144. SQ 2007, c 7, ss 48-51. Huppé has observed that this procedural change was based on a
recommendation of the Comité de Révision de la Procédure Civile in order to avoid improper
interference with judicial independence. Huppé, supra note 92 at 227-34. Huppé argues,
in our view correctly, that the protection of judicial independence does not require that a
judge who is the subject of a motion seeking his or her disqualification be obliged to decide
the motion personally. In our view, there are practical reasons why it is appropriate for
the judge to be empowered to do so, but this should not prevent the creation of rules that
empower the judge to transfer the motion to another judge for adjudication.
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At the same time, many commentators,145 including some judges,146 have
noted the awkwardness of asking the judge whose impartiality is called into
question to adjudicate this issue. This awkwardness is particularly apparent where
the challenge to the judge’s impartiality is based on things the judge has said or
done, either during the course of the hearing or outside of it, that give rise to a
concern on the part of a party that the judge is not capable of deciding the case
impartially. In our view, it would be helpful to give judges the explicit authority
to refer the matter to another judge, especially in such circumstances. We are
mindful of the advantages of regimes that require all recusal motions to be heard
by someone other than the judge whose recusal is sought, at least if the judge does
not recuse himself or herself right away on receiving the motion, but it seems to
us that in most situations, the reasons described above for having the judge whose
recusal is sought make the determination are persuasive. Giving the judge who is
the subject of the recusal application the discretion to refer the matter to another
judge should be sufficient to capture those instances where the interests of justice
would be better served by having another judge make the decision.
The other procedural issue that has raised some difficulties in Canada is the
question of who makes the decision on an application to disqualify one member
of a multi-member panel. While there has been some unevenness in Canadian
practice over time,147 the current view is that the judge whose recusal is sought
makes the decision.148 The more difficult question is whether this decision is
subject to review by the other members of the panel, and, if not, what steps the
other members of the panel should take if they disagree with the other judge’s
decision not to recuse. In SOS-Save Our St. Clair Inc. v Toronto (City),149 the
majority of the panel decided that, based on their concerns regarding the decision
of the third member of the panel not to recuse himself, they would withdraw,
thereby requiring the constitution of a new panel to hear the matter in dispute.
While this type of unfortunate situation is unlikely to arise very often, it seems
145. See e.g. Bassett & Perschbacher, “Elusive Goal”, supra note 29 at 203-207, 213-14; Amanda
Frost, “Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal”
(2004-2005) 53 U Kan L Rev 531 at 571-72, 583-87.
146. See Ebner, supra note 32 at paras 74 (per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow & Hayne JJ), 185
(per Callinan J); Sir Anthony Mason, “Judicial Disqualification for Bias or Apprehended Bias
and the Problem of Appellate Review” (1998) 1 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 21.
147. See Bryden, “Legal Principles,” supra note 6 at 594-95.
148. See SOS-Save Our St Clair Inc v Toronto (City) (2005), 78 OR (3d) 331at paras 19-20,
115-18, 261 DLR (4th) 727 (Ont Div Ct) (per Greer, E. Macdonald & Matlow JJ)
[SOS-Save Our St Clair Inc]; c.f. CEP, Local 60N v Abitibi Consolidated Inc, 2008 NLCA 4 at
para 35, 273 Nfld & PEIR 17.
149. SOS-Save Our St Clair Inc, ibid at 148.
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to us that it would be preferable to have procedural rules that would give both
judges and parties guidance on how to address recusal applications when dealing
with multi-member panels.
One possibility would be to maintain the current practice that would require
the judge whose recusal is being sought to make the decision but add a right of
review of that decision by the other members of the panel. A second possibility,
which would be our preferred option, is to make a rule that the recusal of any
panel member must be addressed by the entire panel.150 A third possibility would
be to adopt the German practice of having all of the members of the panel except
the judge whose recusal is being sought hear the motion.151 We prefer the option
of a rule that the whole panel hear the matter because it enables the parties to have
the benefit of the views of the entire panel on what is, in essence, a legal question.
Presumably if the judge in question is uncomfortable about being involved in
the decision it would be open to him or her to recuse himself or herself on the
motion and let the other members of the panel decide, but as we have suggested
above, in most situations there are reasons why it is appropriate that the judge
whose recusal is being sought have an opportunity to participate in the decision,
even if that judge does not have the final say in the matter.
In our view, express procedural rules included in the rules of court would
be preferable to the current ad hoc approach. Reasonable arguments can be
made for a variety of approaches, as the comparator jurisdictions illustrate. Our
recommendation is to grant judges the express power to refer a recusal motion.
For multi-member panels, we recommend that the panel, not only the judge with
respect to whom a reasonable apprehension of bias is alleged, should entertain
the motion. The judge should have the right to recuse himself or herself from the
decision on the motion.

150. This approach was adopted in admittedly unusual circumstances by the South African
Constitutional Court. See President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby
Football Union [1999] ZACC 9, 1999 (4) SA 147 (S Afr Const Ct). In that case, the
applicants sought the recusal of five of the ten members of the Court, and further allegations
and complaints were made about all of the members of the Court. With the agreement of
counsel, the entire Court heard the motion for recusal.
151. This is the approach used by the New Zealand Supreme Court in Siemer v Heron. Siemer v
Heron, [2011] NZSC 116, [2012] 1 NZLR 293. The applicant sought an order that two
members of the Court not sit on the case on the basis of an apparent bias against him, and
the other three members of the Court heard and dismissed the application.
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VI. CONCLUSION
There are good reasons why the “reasonable apprehension of bias” test is
context-specific and why it may not be possible to supplant it completely with
a comprehensive set of rules governing judicial disqualification. Nevertheless,
the experience in comparator jurisdictions suggests that there may be a place
for recusal rules in some circumstances. The animating reasons for urging a
(modest) resort to a rule-based approach are grounded in efficiency, legitimacy,
and access to justice.
The current case-based approach serves Canadian law well in novel situations
and in cases where only a fulsome review and careful weighing of all the facts
permits a determination whether a judge should recuse. However, many situations
inviting bias considerations are commonplace. Empirical research has shown that
resort to case law in these situations can be problematic because the jurisprudence
does not compel a particular outcome and because the jurisprudence is slanted
towards explaining why a judge should sit while most decisions to recuse are
invisible. Even in situations where the jurisprudence is clear, the outcome is often
difficult to communicate credibly to litigants. This problem is aggravated for
self-represented litigants.
In this article, we have identified four situations where it would be productive
to employ rules to clarify some marginal situations in which it is difficult to
determine when it is, and is not, appropriate for judges to sit. We think rules
would be of benefit to judges and the parties appearing before them in relation
to professional relationships with former colleagues and clients, prior judicial
involvement with litigants, extrajudicial writings, and procedures governing
motions for recusal.
Clarifying the rules surrounding professional relationships and prior judicial
involvement, and rendering them visible to counsel and self-represented litigants,
would make recusal decisions more efficient, avoid unnecessary delays, and tend
to legitimate recusal decisions in the eyes of litigants. The law on extrajudicial
writings in Canada is clear enough, but judges still find themselves having to
explain why they should sit despite having written on an issue now before the
court. This is unnecessarily stressful for all participants. A rule codifying the
existing law would be helpful. Finally, the Canadian literature and the literature
in the comparator jurisdictions confirm that the question of who should decide
recusal is the source of considerable anxiety for judges and litigants alike. The
Canadian rule that the judge whose recusal is sought should decide is sound in
most circumstances. However, there are cases where a fresh set of eyes would
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give comfort to litigants, counsel, and judges. Granting judges the power to refer
the decision would allow for a case-by-case weighing of concerns for efficiency
and legitimacy.
We do not exclude the possibility that there may be other areas in which
rules would be helpful, but it seems to us that in an area where constitutional
considerations lie very close to the surface it may be appropriate to begin with
a relatively conservative approach to the use of rules to clarify the boundaries of
judicial disqualification.

